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Death and Human Dignity 
by 
Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M., M.D. 
Georgetown University Medical Center 
Washington, DC 
"Death with dignity," has often been invoked in arguments regarding 
euthanasia and assisted suicide.1,2,3,4 Only a few authors have reflected seriously 
about what this phrase actually means.S,6,7 Yet, an understanding of death with 
dignity seems critical to an understanding of the ethics of caring for the dying. 
Differences in the positions various authors hold regarding the morality of 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are almost always traceable to deep differences in 
the moral presuppositions which lie just beneath phrases like "death with 
dignity." 
But fruitful debate cannot begin with an unexamined slogan. And small errors 
at the beginning of an argument lead to grave errors in the conclusions.8 Just as an 
understanding of the theory of the molecular biology of cystic fibrosis will 
ultimately lead to better patient care, so an understanding of the theory of human 
dignity and its relationship to the morality of human illness and death will 
ultimately lead to better patient care. The stakes are high. The medical profession 
cannot afford to ignore critical discussion of the fundamentals in the debate about 
euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
In this paper, I will examine and criticize several theories about human dignity. 
I will suggest an alternative interpretation. I will then show what it means for 
doctors and patients to apply that interpretation to end of life decisions. 
What Is Human Dignity? 
Dignity is defined in the dictionary as "the quality or state of being worthy, 
honored, or esteemed.''9 It is something one may have, or something one may 
perceive in another, or in oneself. Dignity, therefore, has both an essential and a 
perceptual aspect. To be perceived to have less than the esteem of which one is 
worthy is to suffer an indignity. To treat oneself or others with less than the proper 
esteem is to behave in an undignified manner. 
Since morality concerns right and wrong behavior towards others, dignity is 
fundamental to morality. In asking why one should treat other human beings as 
worthy, honored, or esteemed, one is really asking a variant ofthe question, why 
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be moral? Almost everyone accepts the idea that the word "dignity" has 
enormous moral importance, and it is often invoked in the euthanasia debate. But 
people seem to differ in their views about what gives other people worth, honor, 
and esteem. Space considerations obviously preclude a full discussion of what 
gives a person dignity. But one simple way to examine the suitability of any 
particular theory about dignity would be to perform a thought experiment: to 
assess the morality ofthe logical consequences of adopting one or another theory. 
I will therefore sketch an outline of what sort of moral world would follow 
logically from accepting each of four common conceptions of human dignity 
-conceptions that are often prominent in arguments about death and human 
dignity. I do this in order to indicate, in a preliminary way, why each of these four 
views is inadequate. 
Arguments about the most appropriate ethical system abound. Yet, it would 
seem that consistency is a minimal requirement of any system worth 
considering.1o Therefore, dignity ought to mean the same thing whether one is 
dealing with the ethics of race relations, child abuse, or euthanasia. A moral 
argument based upon a concept of dignity that cannot be consistently applied in 
all areas of morality is not an acceptable argument. 
1. Social worth - Some might suggest that human dignity depends upon social 
worth. Hobbes wrote that "the public worth of a man, which is the value set on 
him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY."l1 
But it follows from such a Hobbesian conception of human dignity that the 
unemployed, the severely handicapped, the mentally ill, and all others who 
cannot contribute to the economic well-being of society have lost their dignity, if 
they ever had it. This conception stands in obvious opposition to the increasing 
tendency of our society to recognize the dignity of such persons, and would not 
seem to be what most people mean by the term. If human dignity is not lost when 
one loses one's economic value to society, then this Hobbesian conception must 
be rejected. 
2. Freedom - Some might suggest that human dignity depends upon freedom. 
But human dignity cannot be derived solely from the fact that human beings have 
free choice. Human freedom is respected because human beings have dignity, and 
not the other way around. To believe otherwise is to suggest that those who have 
lost control of certain human functions or have lost or never had the freedom to 
make choices, have no dignity. This would mean that infants, the retarded, the 
severely mentally ill, prisoners, the comatose, and perhaps even the sleeping have 
no human dignity. This seems to be a false basic moral intuition. 
In reply, some might suggest that what counts is the capacity for control and 
freedom, and not the exercise of control and freedom. It has been suggested that 
some individuals without full control and freedom nevertheless deserve to be 
treated with dignity either because they have a potential for such a capacity (so 
that children, for instance, come to be regarded as placeholders for actual 
persons), or they have a history of having exercised such a capacity (so that the 
demented, for instance, come to be regarded as remnants of persons ).12 But these 
arguments seem based upon quite tenuous stretches of the concept of dignity 
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based on freedom. Who would feel dignified and secure as a placeholder or a 
remnant? Further, these arguments still cannot answer why those with neither a 
history nor a potential for free, rational choice (such as the severely mentally 
retarded) are worthy of human dignity. In contrast, consider why it is that 
although suicidally psychotic patients have lost the freedom to choose between 
life and death, other human beings intervene to save them. This is done precisely 
because in losing their freedom, these patients have not lost their dignity. Human 
dignity is not to be equated with human freedom and control. The famous 
photograph of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. sitting in an Alabama prison cell 
is a portrait of human dignity in the face of lost freedom and control. 
3. Pleasure and Pain - Some might suggest that human dignity depends upon 
the amount of pleasure and pain in a human life. Certainly, however, most people 
are able to tell stories of the extraordinary lessons in human dignity they have 
learned from persons whose lives have been racked by pain, and most people 
could also tell stories of the undignified lives of human beings who have spent all 
their human energy solely in the pursuit of pleasure. Basing morality squarely on 
a balance between pleasure and pain inevitably leads one to accept the morality 
of certain acts of euthanasia, 13 but this seems to be an anemic account of human 
dignity, and not one that most persons would hold among the basic underlying 
assumptions of a moral system. 
4. A Subjective Account - Some might suggest that human dignity is 
something individuals are free to define as they wish. But this assertion leads to 
numerous philosophical problems. First, the concept of a moral term implies that 
it has universal meaning. 14 Human dignity either means the same thing for all 
human beings or it has no moral meaning at all. If moral terms were to mean 
whatever anyone wants them to mean, all meaningful moral conversation would 
stop. Second, to say that morality is not objective is performatively self-refuting. 
It is self-contradictory to make an objective claim about a subject that one asserts 
is not objective. Third, to say that human dignity is subjective is to claim that one 
person can never reliably recognize the dignity of another person, because the 
other person's dignity depends upon that person's subjective mental states, which 
are potentially subject to constant flux. Finally, under this conception, those who 
are incapable of excercising subjectivity would have no dignity - the severely 
retarded and the comatose, for example. And this does not seem to sit well with 
our considered judgments about morality. Thus, human dignity cannot be a 
purely subjective concept. 
An Alternative Basis for Dignity 
Almost everyone agrees that human beings have dignity. But what is it? Every 
one of the above attempts to say that human dignity consists of "x" - whether of 
social worth, or of freedom, or of pleasure, or of our individual subjectivity is, to 
some extent, a pre-logical assumption. Each requires a leap of moral belief. None 
can be proven. Yet this does not mean that they cannot be argued for. One can 
show that each attempt to say that human dignity consists of this human power or 
that human characteristic leads to an awkward set moral conclusions. 
Thus, one ought to reject the above conceptions of human dignity. I propose 
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instead the following alternative: Human dignity has its basis in the moral 
proposition that every human life has intrinsic meaning and value. In other 
words, human beings have dignity simply because they are human beings. To say 
that human dignity consists of something else, of some characteristic that some of 
us have and some of us don't, or that some of us have in greater abundance than 
others, leads to unacceptable conclusions. 
If human beings have dignity simply because they are human, the following 
are also true: 
a) Everyone, by definition, has dignity. Dignity is thus supremely 
democratic. 
b) Dignity is truly inalienable. No person and no circumstance can take 
dignity away from any human being. 
c) Dignity is also truly qualitative. It does not admit of degrees. It is the 
same for everyone. 
One also should note that it does not follow from this conception that human 
lives have infinite value. The fact of human mortality precludes the possibility 
that human lives are infinitely valuable. Human dignity then depends on the 
recognition that human lives are neither infinitely meaningful and valuable, nor 
ever devoid of meaning and value. As Shakespeare has put it, a human being is 
"the beauty of the world; the paragon of animals; and yet to me, what is this 
quintessence of dust?,'lS 
It also follows that no one can claim the right to declare that any human life is 
devoid of meaning and value. One may act in opposition to human dignity, but to 
freely choose to assault human dignity is to act immorally. A person may be 
treated in an undignified manner, even enslaved, but human dignity is not 
destroyed by human immorality. Pleasure does not increase human dignity, and 
pain does not diminish it. One may be deprived of happiness, and not of one's 
essential human dignity. 
To respect human dignity is to come to terms with what it means, honestly, to 
be human. Honorable human action is the fruit of a correct perception of the 
essence of human dignity - one's own, as well as that of others. Perceptions can 
be more or less correct. Actions can be more or less honorable. But the essence of 
human dignity is nothing more or less than the esteem and honor human beings 
deserve simply because they are human. 
Human Death and Human Dignity 
Therefore, those who suggest that one can never allow a person to die, and that 
one must continuously strive to maintain mere biological life at all cost, no matter 
how much the patient is suffering, are acting against human dignity and therefore, 
acting immorally. Such actions amount to a denial of the truth of human mortality 
and therefore a denial of the truth about the value and meaning of human life - a 
denial of human dignity. Whether an inevitable death is avoided out offear, or out 
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of a bizarre interpretation of "the sanctity of life," holding biological life to be a 
supreme moral value, such deaths are undignified. To continue to fight when 
overmastered by disease, when there is no goal except living itself, can be mere 
hubris. It is not death with dignity. 
On the other hand, to kill a patient, even if that patient is dying, is to suggest 
that the patient's life has lost all meaning and value, and is therefore also to act 
against human dignity - to act immorally. Since human dignity is not dependent 
upon social worth, or freedom, or pleasure, matter how much these may be 
diminished by the circumstances in which a dying person may be found, human 
dignity is not lost. And since human dignity is not SUbjective, no one is capable of 
deciding idiosyncratically that his or her own life has no more dignity. It is 
immoral for a person to decide that any life, including one's own, has no meaning 
or value. It is only possible to wilfully act with the intention of causing a person's 
death by a mechanism that originates in one's own actions if one has decided that 
the person's life either has no meaning and value or has merely instrumental, not 
intrinsic, meaning and value. To do so is to act immorally - to act against human 
dignity. 
If one does not believe in human dignity, if one believes that human beings are 
meaningless chemical events in the evolution of the universe, then further 
discussion is pointless. But if one does believe in human dignity, one also 
recognizes that there are many forces, originating in nature and in human choice, 
that conspire to assault human dignity. Death itself is the pre-eminent assault. 
The fact of human mortality is perhaps the ultimate question about human 
dignity. If human beings have such meaning and value, why do human beings 
die? 
The answers to this question are many. Some answers are religious. Others 
refer to the greater good of humankind or the ecological good of the planet. But 
the fact that human mortality is so troubling a question, troubling enough to be 
raised at all, implies deeply held beliefs about the essence of human dignity. If no 
one held such beliefs, no one would bother to ask the question. 
One must remember that human dignity has both an essential and a perceptual 
aspect. Dignity means both the esteem in which one is held and the esteem of 
which one is worthy. Sickness certainly mounts an assault upon human dignity. 
One may perceive that one has lost one's dignity, or may be perceived as having 
lost one's dignity, when one is forced to strip naked before a doctor, forced to 
reach for a bedpan, covered with vomitus, bleeding, incontinent, demented, or 
otherwise needy. Disease humiliates us. Death humiliates us. But these assaults 
are disturbing precisely because they raise the question of whether human life 
ultimately has any meaning or value, any dignity. 
Medicine and Human Dignity 
Medicine exists precisely to serve the dignity of persons whose dignity is called 
into question by disease and injury. To heal is to remind persons that sickness and 
limitation do not destroy their essential dignity; that their lives continue, in spite 
of it all, to have meaning and value. When it is possible to eliminate the assault on 
dignity wrought by disease, doctors cure. When it is possible to mitigate the 
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assault wrought by disease, doctors palliate and help patients maintain function. 
When the assault can neither be eliminated nor mitigated, healing does not cease. 
Doctors continue to heal by reminding the sick of their essential meaning and 
value even when the pills and needles and machines no longer have a function. 
Hence the medieval aphorism: to cure sometimes, to relieve often, and to comfort 
always, remains an apt description of the essential goals of the medical enterprise. 
It is not easy to remind the dying of their dignity. But that is precisely what it 
means to comfort the dying. 
From the perspective of the patient, to choose death in the face of assaults on 
human dignity is to believe the falsehood that one's life has lost all meaning and 
value. This premise is necessary in order to justify killing oneself, or to justify 
asking to be killed. Some may respond by suggesting that euthanasia is justified 
whenever one determines that one's life no longer has enough dignity, but to do 
so, such persons would need to measure dignity in terms of either pleasure, or 
freedom, or control, or social worth or claim that dignity is purely subjective. But 
as argued above, to use any such measure is to suggest that the essence of human 
dignity consists in something other than simply being human, and this leads to 
morally awkward conclusions. Euthanasia and assisted suicide are freely chosen, 
willful assaults upon human dignity, based upon the premise that a human life 
has no meaning or value. 
On the other hand, to accept one's own death (once it has become inevitable) is 
to accept the truth that one's life is not of infinite value. It is supremely honorable 
to face one's mortality. To face one's mortality is to act with, and not against, 
human dignity. To resist death or to accept death for the sake of something 
greater than one's own life is also supremely honorable, because it is also a 
recognition that one's life is not of infinite value. To die with dignity is to die 
honorably, announcing and not renouncing one's own essential dignity. 
Medicine, as a truly human profession, must also recognize its own dignity. To 
fail to ever allow patients to die, for example, is to fail to recognize the limits of 
medicine. Medicine does not grant immortality. On the other hand, to kill 
patients is to make an undignified and false move beyond the limits of medicine. 
The goal ofthe physician is to make the right andjust healing act for a particular 
patient in his or her particular circumstances.16 Killing patients is neither right, 
nor just, nor an act of healing. It is outside the bounds of medicine.17 
Death and Dignity - A Personal Account 
Like most physicians, I have had patients die under my care. Not one has ever 
asked me for euthanasia or assisted suicide. I would like to think that this is 
because I have struggled to never let my patients believe the falsehood that they 
had somehow lost their human dignity because they were suffering or dying or 
had diminished control over one or another of their bodily functions. I have 
sensed their suffering in such circumstances, and I have reached out in acts of 
compassion. I have seen many patients die prolonged yet dignified deaths, full of 
the knowledge both that their lives had value, and that their lives were not of 
infinite value. These patients faced their mortality with courage, hope, and love. 
Watching them and their families confront the mystery of death has been a 
32 Linacre Quarterly 
. oj 
: I 
( 
.. 
.. 
r 
deeply transformative experience for me as a physician. I was not always able to 
control all of their pain, despite my best efforts. Some died after a few days in 
coma. Some died incontinent. Some died demented. With their consent, I 
withheld and withdrew therapies that would have needlessly prolonged their 
dying. But I have never killed a patient, nor aided a patient in suicide. 
In contrast to these truly "good" deaths, I have had some patients who have 
approached their deaths in despair and fear. I struggled with these patients, 
acknowledging but never ratifying their emotions. I worked to let them know 
that they were not dying alone. I made sure they knew that even if no one else 
would be there, I would be there for them. I struggled to let them know that they 
had not lost all dignity; that they remained connected to the human community 
by the bonds of love even as they were leaving. Sometimes my efforts were 
successful, and they died in peace. Sometimes I was not successful, and these 
patients remained fearful and despairing to the end. I have mourned their deaths 
most of all. But I never once gave up trying to heal the aspects of their suffering 
that morphine can never touch - their need to believe in their own value and 
meaning - their own dignity. This is a daunting task - to heal the 
misperceptions of the dying about their own value; to remind them that they are 
not grotesque creatures who have ceased to have importance because they are 
naked, covered in feces and blood. But this is what medicine does at its limit. This 
is what it means to heal the dying. There could have been no greater assault on 
their human dignity, and ultimately no greater suffering, than ifI had looked even 
one of them in the eye and said, "Yes, you're right. Your life has no meaning or 
value. I'll kill you now if you'd like me to do so." 
Is Suffering Ever Unbearable? 
Some may argue that I am proposing a supererogatory standard, demanding of 
patients more than they can bear. But this sort of counterargument cannot 
withstand careful scrutiny. 
First, I have argued that my account of human dignity is more defensible than 
the alternatives, and that my position regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide 
follows from my account of human dignity. Moral words are universalizable and 
prescriptive. IS This means that ifI am correct, my account of dignity applies in all 
situations. The task for the proponents of euthanasia and assisted suicide is to 
prove that human dignity means something other than what I have suggested, not 
just with respect to euthanasia and assisted suicide, but with respect to all moral 
questions. 
Second, despite the fact that doctors have been able to kill for much longer 
than they have been able to cure, the overwhelming majority of persons who 
have died in the last 2,500 years have neither killed themselves nor have they 
been killed by their physicians. This suggests that the burden of proof is on the 
proponents of euthanasia and assisted suicide to show, despite the development 
of morphine, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, anti-depressants, patient-
controlled analgesia, nerve-blocks, epidural analgesia, biofeedback, and other 
contemporary techniques, coupled with the account of human dignity that I 
propose (which is perfectly compatible with the withholding and withdrawing of any 
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and every modern life-sustaining therapy in the dying), that people today are 
forced to suffer more than their ancestors. The only other alternative, if one 
suggests that death without access to euthanasia or assisted suicide is 
supererogatory, is to argue that every patient who has died a natural death during 
the past 2,500 years without being offered these options has acted 
supererogatively. Both of these options seem false. Declaring euthanasia and 
assisted suicide immoral is not demanding of patients more than they can bear. 
Is This a Purely Religious Argument? 
Some might object that because this argument is compatible with traditional 
Jewish and Christian conceptions of human dignity, it is essentially a religious 
claim and is therefore irrelevant as a public argument. But this is fallacious. First, 
many arguments in the public arena are compatible with religious beliefs, and are 
not eliminated from public debate solely for this reason. The concept of human 
rights, for instance, is compatible with Jewish and Christian belief. There is no 
"proof' that human rights exist. We all accept this as a matter of common moral 
"faith." The fact that this unprovable concept is compatible with religious belief is 
not a reason to eliminate arguments based on human rights from the public 
forum. Likewise, an argument based upon the unprovable concept of human 
dignity proposed in this paper ought not be dismissed simply because it is 
compatible with religious beliefs about human dignity. 
Second, the argument in this paper stands independent of religious conviction. 
One can hold the concept of human dignity proposed in this paper without 
adherence to any credal confession. This argument does not depend upon 
scripture, doctrine, or the opinions of any pope, priest, rabbi, or minister. The fact 
is that arguments must start somewhere, and if dignity is to figure in arguments 
regarding euthanasia it must have a meaning. I have argued that the conception of 
human dignity presented here is better than any of the alternatives. The burden of 
proof now lies with those who propose other concepts of human dignity to show 
that their concepts can be consistently applied throughout a moral system 
without leading to contradiciton and without clashing with our considered moral 
judgments. 
Conclusion 
Many arguments against euthanasia and assisted suicide have been based upon 
considerations of the social consequences.19,20 Many of the counterarguments 
have been attempts to show that safeguards can be constructed to place wedges 
along the "slippery SIOpe."21,22 This paper has presented arguments about why 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are intrinsically immoral acts. Euthanasia and 
assisted suicide are immoral because these actions directly attack the bedrock 
human value which makes all other human values possible - the inherent 
dignity of human life. 
The demand for euthanasia and assisted suicide is, in some ways, an ironic 
demand for a quick technological solution to the problems technology itself has 
created. But this amounts to a form of denial. It is a stubborn refusal to accept the 
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truth about medicine - its value, its meaning, and its limits. It is at the same time 
a stubborn refusal to accept the truth about being human - its value, its meaning, 
and its limits. It is absolutely true that physicians must be more affectively 
responsive and sympathetic to the needs of the dying and absolutely true that 
physicians need to muster more compassion for the dying. But affect without 
truth is not mercy. It is mere sentimentalism. The dying need healing from their 
doctors. The dying must always be assured by doctors that they have not lost their 
human dignity - that they continue to have worth, honor, and esteem. The 
dying need doctors who recognize that their lives have a measure of meaning and 
value which is far from infinite, but never nil. The dying do not need to suffer the 
final indignity of a sensitive but unthinking doctor wielding a syringe filled with 
100 mEq of Kel, or a prescription for 100 secobarbital capsules which reads, 
"Take these when you need them, and if you wake up in the morning, call me." 
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